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Much progress has been made in recent years on developing and applying a direct mea-
sure of utility using survey questions on subjective well-being. In this paper we explore
whether this new type of measurement can be fruitfully applied to the study of interdependent
utility in general, and altruism between parents and children in particular. We introduce an
appropriate econometric methodology and, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
for the years 2000-2002, ﬁnd that the parents’ self-reported happiness depends positively, albeit
not very strongly, on the happiness of adult children who moved out.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D6, D64, C25, J10
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
In economics, altruism is commonly deﬁned in terms of behavior. The standard deﬁnition
involvesa transfer: an altruist reduces his or her own wealth or consumptionin order to increase
the wealth or consumption of a beneﬁciary. Often, altruism is studied in the context of a family,
where the benefactor is the parent and the beneﬁciary is the child.1 The altruism hypothesis
says that parents make transfers to their children because they care for their well-being per se,
without expecting to be “paid back" and have a direct material beneﬁt in return. Becker (1974,
1981, 1991) formalized parental altruism within a framework of utility maximization under
interdependent preferences. Past empirical studies of altruism have focussed on predictions of
the model, such as the implied correlation between transfer payments and income, rather than
on the preference structure per se.
We argue that such a direct analysis is now overdue since much progress has been made
in recent years on developing and applying a direct measure of utility using survey questions
on subjective well-being, or happiness. In fact, economically motivated empirical research on
the determinants of individual happiness has boomed (see e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2001, 2002,
Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004). However, relatively few studies have investigated whether
and how happiness between persons is interdependent. Exceptions include Winkelmann and
Winkelmann (1995) who document a large negative effect of a husband’s unemployment on
the happiness of the spouse, and Winkelmann (2005) who models the intra-family correlation
of subjective well-being using a hierarchical random-effects model. In this paper, we explore
whether this new type of measurement of utility can be fruitfully applied to the study of the
nature of interdependent preferences in general, and altruism between parents and children in
particular.
In the spirit of Becker’s seminal analysis and many papers that followed, we concentrate
on altruism within the extended family. One reason for this is pragmatic, as we have access to
survey data on happiness of parents and adult children. A second reason is substantive, since
knowing whether transfers of income, wealth and in-kind services between family members are
driven by altruism, exchange or joy of giving is crucial for efﬁcient reforms of old age security,
1 Altruistic behavior can of course also be found among non-related individuals. Recent experimental research
considers cases where the “benefactor"incurs costs to punish the “beneﬁciary", an instance of so-called altruis-
tic punishment, which may be applied to a norm-violatoror non-cooperatingperson in a situation that requires
cooperation (see for example Fehr und Fischbacher, 2003)
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long-term care and social assistance. It can be shown, e.g., that attempts by governments to
redistribute income between generations can be neutralized if families are altruistic, since if
the income of a beneﬁciary of an altrustic transfer is increased, that transfer will be reduced
by an equal amount (see Laferrére and Wolff, 2004, for a current survey of the literature).
The majority of empirical papers estimate inter household transfer equations where the amount
of transfers from parents to children is regressed on the parents’ income and income of the
child together with other variables. Subsequently, tests can be set up to verify predictions
from the model of altruistic families. However, this approach requires speciﬁc data on transfer
paymentsbetweenfamilymembers, andoursuggestiontotestforaltruismwithwidelyavailable
happiness responses therefore constitutes a potentially useful alternative.
Section 2 describes the data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). A de-
scriptive analysis of happiness interdependencies between parents and their children is given
in Section 3. In Section 4 we consider a simple model of altruistic families as the starting
point for testing altruistic preferences empirically. We ﬁnd that the identiﬁcation and estimation
of the altruism parameter faces a number of obstacles that are subsequently addressed in the
econometric analysis. In a nutshell, the correlation in happiness between parents and children
is not a good measure of altruism, since it ignores omitted variables as well as the simultaneity
(or reﬂection) problem. Panel models with individual speciﬁc effects and instrumental variable
estimators can address these issues. We discuss models with and without the simplifying as-
sumptionof cardinality of the ordered happinessresponses. The regression results are presented
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Since the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) was started in 1984, many children moved
from their parents’ household to live in an own household alone or together with a partner and
own children.2 An important feature of the SOEP is to trace moved persons. New households
founded by persons who moved from an original panel household become a member of the
SOEP sample. The SOEP also provides information to link moved children with household
as well as personal information of their mother, father or both. The longer the SOEP lasts the




greater the probability to ﬁnd parents who can be linked to their children outside the household.
Thus, the recent waves of the SOEP from 2000 to 2002 are used to construct the data set. For
some of the models we want to estimate, a single cross-section would be sufﬁcient. For others,
however, the panel information is essential.
The basic unit of observation is a parent-child pair. We start by extracting from the SOEP
all parents, be they fathers or mothers. If we can ﬁnd for any of these fathers or mothers and
any year information for at least one child that lives in a spin-off household and provides valid
information in the data, this parent-child pair constitutes one observation. Each additional child
for a given parent generates one additional observation. The structure of the data set from the
parents point of views, for the year 2002, is depicted in Table 1. The basis are 1,750 parents
for whom information on up to ﬁve children not living in the same household was found in
the SOEP. For 1,317 parents information for one child not living in the same household was
found. 363 parents have two children, thus they are doubled. And so on. All together the data
set consists of 2,264 observations (=parent/child pairs). From the total of 1,750 parents 1,454
or 83 percent share the same household background, meaning they lived together in the same
household when their children were young.
— Table 1 —
The sampling structure generates two types of interdependencies between records of
parents-child pairs. First, in any year information on the same child can appear twice, once
linked to the father and once linked to the mother. Second, information on a parent can appear
repeatedly, up to ﬁve times, as the same parent is observed in different parent/child combina-
tions. Therefore, the dataset does not really form a random sample from the universe of all
parents. In the regression analysis reported below, for example, each parent is included only
once per year, and the information on children is averaged if more than one child is observed
for that parent. Finally, we also should point out that the data have a household structure (as
both parents are observed in most cases). As to the time structure, we do not require the panel
to be balanced. In fact, the total number of parents in the data with at least one entry over all
three years is 2,106. 18.4 percent of parents are observed only once, 23.9 percent are included
twice and the remaining fraction of 57.7 percent is observed in all three years, adding up to
5,041 independent parent-year observations. The total number of children in any year is 1,679.




The SOEP provides a wide range of socio-economic variables on households and persons.
Satisfaction is central for the present paper. Each respondent is asked for her life satisfaction:
’How satisﬁed are you with your life, all things considered? Please answer according to the
following scale: ’0’ means completely dissatisﬁed, ’10’ means completely satisﬁed’. In Table 2
we see that the arithmeticmean of the happiness response is 6.6 for parents and 7.1 for children.
— Table 2 —
In addition, we extract information on the following usual characteristics, which have been
discussed in the literature as potential determinants of life satisfaction: age, age squared, health,
gender, nationality, years of education, marital status, whether widowed, whether divorced,
household size, number of children, place of abode, employment status, and income. Health is
measured by a self rating of the respondents on a ﬁve point scale, and converted to a “good-
health"indicatorforthevalues fourand ﬁve. Income is measured as disposablemonthlyincome
of the household (pre-government income). Information for children not living in the parent’s
household are age, gender, marital status, health, education, employment status, and household
income. All these variables are computed in the same way as for parents.
From Table 2, we see that parents are on average about 27 years older than their adult
children. Children report a substantially better health than parents (69 percent as opposed to 30
percent with “good health"). On the other hand, the marital rate is much lower among children
than among parents (48 percent as opposed to 83 percent). Fewer children own a house, and
their average income is about 12 percent below the income of parents.
In addition to those standard socio-economic variables, two measure of distance are used.
The distance between a parent and her child might be important in two ways. First, the dis-
tance itself might inﬂuence a parent’s well-being. Second, the distance can serve as a measure
of information. The greater the distance between the households the less accurate might be
the information which parents have about the living conditions of their children. We employ
two measures for the geographical distance between parents and children. A ﬁrst is a simple
indicator whether or not the child lives in the same district as the parents – this is the case for
67 percent of all children. The second is the distance in kilometers, using the geographical
coordinate of the county’s midpoint (European Terrestrial Reference System, ETRS89).3
3 According to data protection rules, this part of research using regional information was carried out at the DIW
Berlin. We thank the staff for making the information available.
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What prima facie evidence is there for interdependent happiness? For example, is it the case
that happier parents also have happier children? Since happiness is measured as an ordinal dis-
crete variable, we ﬁrst look at cross-tabulations rather than correlations. Table 3 shows such
a simple cross-tabulation of happiness for parents and children. Observations are pooled over
the three years. The original eleven point scale is collapsed into a trichotomy: 0-5, 6-7, 8-10
corresponding to the notions of below, average, and above average happiness. The table indi-
cates a positive relationship between the happiness of children and the happiness of parents.
For example, only 23 percent of parents of children with below average happiness report an
above average happiness themselves, compared to 43 percent of those parents with above av-
erage happy children. A formal Pearson chi-squared test rejects the independence hypothesis
with p-value of 0.000.4 A similar result is obtained, when the original eleven-point scale rather
than the grouped categories is used.
— Table 3 —
If happiness between parents and children were causally related, then one would expect to
ﬁnd that changes in happiness between parents and children are related as well. In fact, such
an association would be stronger evidence for a causal relation, as it eliminates any potential
confoundinginterference oftime-invariantfactors that affect happinessof bothparent and child.
Happiness changes can be computed for parent-child pairs, where valid happiness responses
are observed for at least two consecutive years. In our data, there are a total of 4401 such
differences, and their joint frequencies are displayed in Table 4. For simplicity, we at ﬁrst only
distinguish between the three outcomes “decrease", “no change", and “increase".
— Table 4 —
An interesting pattern is the high proportion of “no change" among parents. Indeed, the
“no change" fraction is almost twice as high among parents than among children, and parents’
responses accordingly are much more stable than those of children. This may be due to a
survey effect according to which more extreme responses on the eleven point happiness scale
areless likelytobechosen thelongertheindividualparticipatedin thesurvey. Anotherpotential
4 ThePearsontest is hereonlyanapproximation,as it assumes independentsampling,whereasthe datapresented
here exhibit some systematic interdependencies, as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the test will
somewhat underestimate the true p-value.
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explanationis that parents tend to be older – the average age of parents in thesampleis 57 years,
compared to 30 years for children – and the life circumstances of older persons are more settled
than those of younger ones, leading to less variation in the happiness responses.
Although a Pearson chi-squared test rejects the null-hypothesis of independence, the direc-
tion of the effect is not so clear and, at a minimum, not very strong. For example, the Spearman
rank correlation between the changes of parents and children is 0.032, with p-value of 0.035. A
possible reason for the small effect might be that the evidence in Table 4 does not distinguish
between small and large changes in happiness. For example, how does an increase (or decrease)
of a child’s happiness by a minimum of 3 points on the eleven point response scale associate
with contemporaneous changes in parental happiness? Table 5 provides evidence on the effect
of such substantial changes in child happiness on parents’ happiness by displaying the condi-
tional distributions of the changes in parents’ happiness.5 Indeed, we ﬁnd that the effect is now
somewhat larger compared to the effect of any change (repeated in the ﬁrst two columns of the
table). For example, the relative frequency of an increase in happiness for parents is lowered by
5 percentage points if the child’s happiness decreased by a minimum of 3, compared to the case
where the child’s happiness increased by a minimum of 3. In the “all changes" comparison, the
corresponding effect is reduced to 2.5 percentage points.
— Table 5 —
Tosummarize, thereissomeevidenceforinterdependenthappinessresponsesofparentsand
adult children who have left home and live in their own household. However, the association
is not very strong. Moreover, this descriptive analysis does not distinguish between alternative
explanations for the interdependence. In particular, it cannot establish whether it is due to
altruism on the part of parents and children, or whether it is due to some other factors. For
a closer understanding of what these results tell us about altruism, we need a more formal
modeling approach as it is provided in the next section.
4 Empirical models of altruism
We consider altruism in the context of a family, speciﬁcally between parents and adult children
who have left home. The choice of altruism between parents and adult children who no longer
5 Suchlargechangesareofcourserelativelyinfrequent. Thetableis basedon93and97observationsfornegative
/ positive changes respectively.
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live at home has both theoretical and practical advantages. A theoretical reason for this focus
is that it ties in nicely with the literature on economic linkages in the extended family (for
example Altonji et al, 1992). Deﬁning the family properly has important consequences for the
efﬁcacy of family and tax policies. A practical reason is that only adult children (or at least
those aged 17 or above) respond to the happiness question. Moreover, only for children living
ina separate householdistheindependent informationon consumptionproxiesavailable, which
is required for an instrumental variable estimation, as detailed below. Although the focus here
is on parents and adult children most of the methods discussed in this section are more general,
and could be equally applied to other within-family (e.g. altruism between parents and children
living at home or between spouses) or not-within family pairings (friends, colleagues, unrelated
persons).
Starting point is the Becker (1991) formulation of an additive separable altruistic utility
function:6
Z = U(Cp) + ηV (Ck) (1)
where Cp denotes consumption of the parent and Ck denotes consumption of the child. Thus,
the total utility of the parent Z equals utility from own consumption plus the child’s utility from
consumption times η, where 0 ≤ η < 1.7
In the following we explore possibilities to estimate η directly, and to test the hypothesis
η = 0 (=selﬁshness) against the alternative η > 0 (=altruism).8 In previous empirical research
inspiredby Becker’s utilityformulation, itwas taken forgranted that utilitycannot bemeasured.
Therefore, tests for altruistic preferences were based on behavioral implications, for example
how transfer payments between parents and children adjust when income changes, that arise if
the utility function (1) is maximized subject to some constraints (for a survey see Laferrére and
6 The idea of such a formalisation of altruism is in fact much older. Edgeworth in his Mathematical Psychics
of 1881, considering an economy with two agents X and Y with utility P and Π, respectively, wrote that
“...we might suppose that the object which X (whose own utility is P), tends –in a calm, effective moment– to
maximise, is not P but P + λΠ; where λ is a coefﬁcient of effective sympathy.” (p. 53).
7 The Becker altruistic utility function is a special case of general interdependent preferences where Z =
U(Cp,Ck).
8 We won’t enter into the philosophical debate whether maximizing one’s own utility is a selﬁsh endeavor per
deﬁnition, and therefore cannot possibly be labeled “altruistic”. The key point is that for η > 0 such a utility
functionwouldinduceanobservablebehaviorthatconformswelltothecommonnotionof“altruisticbehavior”,
i.e., giving up own material goods for the beneﬁt of others.
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Wolff, 2004). By contrast, it is our working assumption that proxy measures for utility Z and
V are available, namely survey responses to the question on current subjective well-being, or
happiness, as they are elicited in many current household surveys. Under this assumption, the
selﬁshness hypothesis can be tested directly based on (1), without observing consumption data
or transfer payments at all.
We have described the employed data before. The basic unit of observation is a parent,
either father or mother. The precondition for inclusion in the data is that for a given parent year
observation, at least one child in a spin-off household has been surveyed in the data. In this
case, Vit is the reported happiness score of that child. If more than one child is included in the
survey,Vit is the averageoverthe reported happiness scores of all children. The data have also a
household dimension (if observations are available for father and mother), but this dimension is
inconsequential for identifying the altruism parameter, although it has implications for compu-
tating standard errors and therefore valid inference. Also, we are well aware that the happiness
measure from the eleven point response scale is discrete and ordinal. However, we will disre-
gard this aspect initially and treat the survey responses as cardinal variables. This simpliﬁes the
estimation of models with individual effects and simultaneity. Alternative methods for discrete
ordinal data will be discussed later on.
4.1 Linear Models
To understand the possibilities for estimating the altruism parameter with data as described, we
start from (1). If Cp and Ck were unrelated, we could rewrite the equation as
Model 1 Z = α + ηV + u
with u = U(Cp) and η = Cov(Z,V )/Var(V ). Hence, a valid estimator of the altruism coefﬁ-
cient could be obtained from a simple linear regression of Z on V .
However, the required assumption that Cp and Ck are unrelated is not very plausible. For
example, we know that intergenerational mobility in education and income is limited (for Ger-
many, see e.g. Dustmann (2004) and Lillard (2001)). Therefore, children of parents with above
average income tend to have above average income and consumption possibilities themselves.
Another argument builds directly on the underlying household consumption model: If families
are altruistically linked they pool their resources (incomes) to ﬁnance consumption. But if Cp
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and Ck are positively correlated, the least squares regression coefﬁcient from estimating (1)
directly is upward biased.
An obvious remedy to this problem is to include the parents’ consumption as controls, and
to estimate η based on the ceteris paribus variation of V given Cp. If a measure of individual
consumption is not available, as is often the case in general purpose household survey data, we
can instead proxy it by a number of socio-economic characteristics, such as income, household
size and composition, education level and employment status. This leads us to
Model 2 Z = α + x
′
pβ + ηV + u
which can be estimated by multiple linear regression. The model can be further generalized by
including individual speciﬁc intercepts
Model 3 Z = αi + x
′
pβ + ηV + u
These individual speciﬁc effects can be estimated (and thus treated as ﬁxed effects) as long
as repeated observations on parents and children are available, data from the German socio-
economic panel being an example.9 The ﬁxed effects model addresses a couple of potential
problems associated with Model 2. First, endogeneity of V due to correlated consumption
can remain a problem as long as unobserved variation in parental consumption (the part that
is not captured by x′
pβ) is correlated with the child’s consumption. To the extent that this
correlation is based on permanent factors, Model 3 will take care of it and allow for unbiased
estimation of η. Second, one has to face the possibility that there is some inter-individual
variation in the utility functions U(Cp) and V (Ck). For example, let Ui(Cp) = U(Cp) + γi and
Vi(Ck) = V (Ck)+ξi wheretheterms γi and ξi symbolizedifferentattitudestowardswell-being.
For example, “optimists” will report higher well-being levels (for a given consumption level)
than “pessimists”. Similar differences can arise if individuals anchor their responses differently
on the eleven point response scale. Estimation of η based on Model 2 is affected if there is a
correlationbetween γi and ξi, as wouldarisefor instanceifpersonalitytraitssuch as “optimism”
9 We see that household speciﬁc effects cannot be estimated as ﬁxed effects: although in many households, two




or“anchoring ofresponses”are genetically transmitted. Model3 with individualspeciﬁceffects
can identify the altruism parameter even in the presence of such effects.
Models 1 to 3 are direct empirical translations of Becker’s utility function (1). In this for-
mulation it is supposed that the child is egoistic. This assumption had its logic since altruistic
preferences were ﬁrst introduced by Becker in the context of parents and children, especially
young children.10 For adult children, or husbands and wives, however, such an asymmetry is
questionable. If we allow that children are altruistic towards their parents as well, then we
obtain, in obvious notation, a simultaneous equations system with two equations
Model 4
Zp = αi,p + x′
pβp + ηpZk + up
Zk = αi,k + x′
kβk + ηkZp + uk
In this model, Zk is contemporaneously correlated with up as long as ηk  = 0. For example,
assume that the two altruism parameters (of parents towards adult children and of children to-
wards parents) are the same. For the simplest case (αj = 0, βj = 0), we obtain after substitution
a reduced form equation for Zk:
Zk = η(ηZk + up) + uk =
η
1 − η2up +
1
1 − η2uk (2)
from where we see that the correlation in the structural equation between Zk and up is ησ2
p/(1−
η2). In this case, OLS estimation of the altruism parameter in Equation 1 has probability limit




p/(1 − η2)2 + σ2
k/(1 − η2)2 (3)
An interesting consequence is that under H0 : η = 0, there is no bias whatsoever, so that the
null hypothesis of selﬁshness can be tested directly from Model 3 without accounting for simul-
taneity.11 If the null is rejected (or if one wants to consider more general forms of simultaneity
where ηp  = ηk), we will need to consider methods for consistently estimating the ﬁrst structural
equation of Model 4. The ﬁxed effects estimator only accounts for the fact that Zk might be
10 Another justiﬁcation follows from Becker’s “rotten kid theorem”, that sufﬁcient caring by an effective altruist
(a person who provides at least half the family income) “... induces even a selﬁsh beneﬁciary to act as if she
cares about the benefactor as much as she cares about herself.” (Becker 1981, p. 5)
11 Unfortunately, the result does not carry over to more general models (where β  = 0) but it still provides useful
guidance for the bias that is to be expected.
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correlated with time invariant individual characteristics that also affect Zp. Hence, ﬁxed effects
estimation alone is inconsistent, and we need to use instrumental variables. Both structural
equations are (over)identiﬁed since within this model, the consumption proxies of one person
(xp or xk) affect the other person only through their effect on Z. Hence, they can be used as
instruments.
Toget an estimablemodel, wemustﬁrst deal withthepresenceofαi,p. Wooldridge(2002, p.
310) recommends to estimate pooled two-stage least squares using within-transformed data and
instruments. Thus Zk is replaced by its predicted value from a regression of the time-demeaned
Zk on all time-demeaned exogenous variables, i.e. xp and xk.
4.2 Extensions
So far, our modelling followed strictly the simple Becker utility function (1). Under the main-
tained assumption of the model, a positive partial effect of the child’s utility unambiguously
identiﬁes altruistic preferences. However, if one broadens the model somewhat and considers
other aspects of the parent-child relationship, alternative interpretations for a positive interde-
pendence in happiness become possible. In other words, a positive η does not need to signify
altruism at all.
A ﬁrst such alternative explanation is joy of giving. If parents derive direct happiness from
making a transfer to their child, regardless of the consequences of the transfer for the child’s
utility, then such joy of giving will erroneously be interpreted as altruism. In the above Models
1-4, this situation can be interpreted as omitted variable bias. The transfer enters the error term
up with positive sign and at the same time increases, on average, the utility of the child, thereby
leading to an upward bias in ηp. The simplesolution, then, is to includetransfers directly among
the regressors. In doing so, the joy of giving motive and the altruism motive can be estimated
and tested separately.
A second potential problem with the simple Becker model are paternalistic preferences.
These arise if parents derive happiness from xk directly, regardless of their effect on the chil-
dren’s utility. Obviously, Models 1-4 are then misspeciﬁed, as the variables xk are excluded
from the parents happiness equation. We doubt, however, that this is a serious problem in
practice. True, parents may have paternalistic preferences and value for example the child’s
education per se. But the child’s education is largely time invariant. It is likely, therefore, that
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such paternalistic preferences are implicitly controlled for in the person speciﬁc intercept and
do not lead to a bias in η.
We mention two further generalizations of the Becker model. The ﬁrst relates to activities
that children may undertake in order to help and support their parents. If these services enter
the child utility negatively and the parents utility positively, not controlling for this unobserved
variable would tend to reduce the estimated altruism parameter. Similarly, if parents observe
the child’s utility only with error, the altruism parameter would be, under the assumptions of the
classical measurement error model, biased towards zero. Although we cannot explicitlyaddress
these issues in our analysis we are not overly concerned, as the direction of the bias means that
it becomes harder to ﬁnd evidence for altruism but if we do, the weight of the evidence is
strengthened.
4.3 Ordered Probit Modeling
So far, we have ignored for simplicity that the data are ordinal and cast all models in terms of
linear regressions. A possible reﬁnement of the model takes Model 3,
Z
∗





as the underlying latent model, and use a threshold mechanism to derive a model for the dis-
crete ordered happiness responses. For example, under the additional assumption that up has a
standard normal distribution, and with
Zp =

      
      
0 if Z∗
p ≤ κ1
1 if κ1 < Z∗
p ≤ κ2
   
J if Z∗
p > κJ
where κ1,...,κJ are cut points that need to be estimated jointly with the β’s and η, the condi-
tional probabilities of the ordered responses are given by
P(Zp = j|xp,V
∗








k ) ,j = 0,...,J (4)
where Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
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It would be normal procedure to estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likeli-
hood. This begs the question how to deal with the individual speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, the fact that
V ∗
k is unobserved, and with the simultaneity of V ∗
k . One might be tempted to copy linear model
strategies, for instance include n − 1 individual dummies and replace V ∗
k by a predicted value.
However, such a strategy would be misguided in the current context. First, as to the dummy
variable formulation, there is an incidental parameter problem that leads to inconsistency of the
ML estimate for η. Also, differencing or the within transformation are not an option for remov-
ing the individual speciﬁc effect in non-linear models such as this one. Therefore, we suggest
to follow the Mundlak (1978) approach and model the correlation between the ﬁxed effects and
the regressors directly by including the individual averages of the explanatory variables among
the regressors (see also Wooldridge, 2002). Under the additional assumption
αi,p|xp,Vk ∼ Normal(¯ x
′





where ¯ xp and ¯ V ∗









k + ¯ x
′
pδ1 + δ2¯ V
∗




tional independence of Zp,i1,...,Zp,iT conditional on xp, V ∗
k and αi (which implies the absence
of autocorrelation in the error terms), the model can be estimated as a simple pooled ordered
probit. All coefﬁcients are scaled by the factor (1+σ2
α)−1/2. Alternatively, and more efﬁciently,
one can estimate a random effects ordered probit model (with time averages included), obtain
an estimate of σ2
α and thereby recover the original parameters β and η.
A further problem is that the regressor of main interest, V ∗
k , is unobserved. Terza (1987)
suggested to replace it by its marginal expected value given by
E(V
∗
k |Vk = j) = E(V
∗
k |µj < V
∗
k < µj+1) =
φ(µj) − φ(µj+1)
Φ(µj+1) − Φ(µj)
, j = 0,...,10 (5)
where the µj’s are the quantiles of a standard normal distribution for sample cumulativerelative
frequencies of the 11 response categories.
With regard to the simultaneity issue, it is inadmissible to use a two-stage least squares in
non-linear models such as this one (Wooldridge, 2002). There is no simple way to deal with
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simultaneity in ordered probit models, and we will need to rely on results from the linear model
in order to assess the magnitude of simultaneity bias.
5 Regression Results
The results for the four linear speciﬁcations are shown in Table 6. The standard errors in paren-
theses havebeen adjusted for clusteringat the householdlevel. In thelinear model theestimated
altruism parameter ˆ η indicates by how much the predicted happiness of parents changes when
the happiness of the child (or the average happiness of the children if there are several of them)
increases by one.12
— Table 6 —
A comparison of the estimated values across the models shows that the altruism parameter
is largest in the simple linear regression Model 1. The point estimate is 0.25; thus the happiness
of parents increases by one for each four point increase in happiness of the child. The effect is
highly signiﬁcant. Moving to the other models 2-4, the magnitude of ˆ η is steadily reduced. This
is to be expected, as the discussion of thepotential biases of the simpleleast squares coefﬁcients
in the previous section has shown. First, controlling for other socio-economic factors – and
thereby accounting for the correlation in consumption between parents and children, ˆ η drops
to 0.17. If individual speciﬁc effects are included, ˆ η is further reduced to 0.06. It remains
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. F-tests show that Model 1 is rejected against
Model 2, which in turn is rejected against the ﬁxed effects Model 3.
The fourth column of Table 6 shows the results from the instrumented ﬁxed effects model,
where the children’s socio-economic characteristics (the exclusion restrictions) serve as instru-
ments. In the ﬁrst stage regression, which is not shown here, health, employment and income
have strong explanatory power. The instruments are highly signiﬁcant with an F-statistic of 5
and a p-valueof 0.000. Since there are more instruments(12) than endogenous variables (1), we
can test for the overidentifying restrictions. The F-statistic has a p-value of 0.25. Thus, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between errors and instruments, and we can have
some conﬁdence in the set of instruments. This statistical test therefore supports the substantive
12 The standard deviation of the children’s happiness is 1.5 – hence such an increase corresponds to an increase
by about 0.7 standard deviations.
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argument that children’s consumption should affect parents’ happiness only through its effect
on happiness.
In Model 4, the estimate of η drops to 0.02 and it is no longer statistically different from
zero. Having established the validity of the instruments, we can now test for the endogeneity
of the children’s happiness in the parental happiness equation. We ﬁnd that the Hausman test
cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (p-value of 0.70). Although not rejecting H0
can also be due to the low power of the test, we interpret this as evidence that Model 3, rather
than Model 4, gives us our preferred estimate of the altruism parameter. This result seems to be
counterintuitive at ﬁrst, since there are a-priori reasons to assume that altruism is reciprocical.
A simple explanation for this result might be that the bias is not very large. For example, we
can take the bias formula (3) as starting point for a back-of-the envelope calculation. The bias
depends on the unknown σ2
p and σ2
k. For example, with σ2
k = 2σ2
p, a structural parameter of 0.4
will lead to an OLS estimate of 0.6. The difference between the two is well within the margin
of error and thus unlikely to appear statistically signiﬁcant in a test. On the other hand, the IV
estimator in Model 4 lacks precision and may be subject to the well-known small sample biases
of instrumental variable estimators that have been documented in other contexts.
While the estimated altruism effect in our preferred Model 3 is rather small, it is, apart from
health, income and unemployment, the only statisticallysigniﬁcant regressor in the ﬁxed effects
model. Other factors such as schooling or marital status but also the spatial distance between
parents and children are not statistically signiﬁcant. Also, transfers do not affect the parent’s
happiness signiﬁcantly, as shown in the last column of Table 6. Hence, we ﬁnd no evidence in
favor of the joy of giving hypothesis, and the interpretation of the parameter η in Model 3 as
altruism is not invalidated.
>From an economic point of view, it does not matter how large η is, as long as it is positive.
Any positive η will induce a behavior of the utility maximizing agent that will conform to
the common notion of altruism (i.e., giving up consumption in order to increase the utility of
the beneﬁciary). Also, if compared to the effect of income there is a sense that the altruism
parameter is not so small after all, since an increase of the child’s happiness by one standard
deviationhasapproximatelythesameeffect asan increaseofhouseholdincomeby20percent.13
13 The one standard deviation change refers to the transformed measurement scale – see (5). In the orignal
responses, this corresponds to about 1.5 points on the eleven point scale.
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However, this result should not be overinterpreted, since other factors, including health and
unemployment, have much larger income equivalents.
The linear speciﬁcation we have worked with so far assumes a cardinal scale of measure-
ment and ignores that the underlying random variable is discrete and ordinal. Therefore, in Ta-
ble 7, we also show the corresponding results from ordered probit models. We estimated three
versions. As in the linear case, Model 1 does not include any covariates apart from the happi-
ness index of the child. Model 2 includes a number of socio-economic controls and Model 3 is
a ﬁxed effects model in the Mundlak (1978) formulation, where individual means of all time-
varying regressors are included in addition to the original regressors from Model 2. The three
models are nested and likelihood ratio tests can be used to discriminate amongst them. Model
1 is rejected against Model 2 with controls for observed heterogeneity, and Model 2 is rejected
against Model 3 that accounts for correlation between individualtime-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity (the ﬁxed effects) and the regressors. Hence, as in the linear case, statistical criteria
speak for Model 3.
— Table 7 —
It is reassuring that the central conclusions remain essentially unaffected. The estimated
altruism parameter is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The implied child well-being / in-
come tradeoff is about the same as in the linear model once we account for the fact that the
child-variable has been rescaled in the ordered response model so that the standard deviation
is now two-thirds of the original variable. We can use the estimated ordered probit coefﬁcients
to predict the changes in the response probabilities for a one standard deviation increase in the
children’s happiness indicator (≈ 1.5 standard deviationson the untransformed scale). In a non-
linear model such as this one, the effect will depend on the values of the explanatory variables.
Foran average person (where all regressors are set to the samplemeans)the probabilityof being
happy (8 or above on the 0-10 scale) increases by 2.2 percentage points from 33 to 35.2 percent.
For a rather unhappy person – represented by a predicted outcome distribution shifted to the left
such that ˆ Z∗
p = ˆ κ3 – such an increase does not make much of a difference, as the already small




“What can happiness research tell us about altruism?”, was the question that motivated the
research in thispaper. Quitealot, we think. Modelinginterdependenciesin happinessresponses
among respondents is a promising new area of research that allows for quantiﬁcation and direct
tests of the altruism hypothesis. Of course, the potential reasons for interdependent happiness
responses are manifold, altruism being only one of them, and establishing causal relationships
is not trivial. But even in the absence of experimental data, good identiﬁcation strategies are
available for household panel surveys.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 2000-2002, we ﬁnd that
the happiness of adult children who have left their parental home has a statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the parents’ self-reported happiness. Hence, in following Becker’s deﬁnition of al-
truism, there is evidence that parents have altruistic preferences. The altruism effect appears
sizeable when converted to money equivalents. However, the small marginal effects in the
linear model (or marginal probability effects in the ordered probit model) mean that altruism
contributes little to the overall variation in happiness among parents. From an economic point
of view, however, it does not matter how large η is, since any positive η will induce a behavior
of the utility maximizing agent that will conform to the common notion of altruism.
One explanation for the relatively small overall effect might be that the altruism parameter
estimated by our models is a population average. In reality, substantial parameter heterogeneity
is likely. For example, Phelps (2001) reports on psychological research aimed at distinguishing
between altruists and selﬁsh individuals. If we keep the simple distinction between altruists
(η > 0) and selﬁsh persons (η = 0), rather than allowing for a continuumof degrees of altruism,
and if we take the psychological benchmark that about 20 percent of the population are altruists
(Phelps, 2001), we ﬁnd that a weighted average altruism parameter from the linear model with
ﬁxed effects of 0.06, say, would imply a much larger effect of 0.30 (since 0.06 = 0.8×0+0.2×
0.30) among altruists. In future work, we plan to estimate the share of altruists endogenously
using ﬁnite mixture models. Eventually, such models may yield a classiﬁcation of individuals
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Structure of the data set 2002
Children not living in Number of parents Mothers Fathers Number of
parents household observations
Frequency Percent Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent
One 1,317 75.3 708 609 1,317 58.0
Two 363 20.7 199 164 726 32.2
Three 61 3.5 33 28 183 8.1
Four 7 0.4 4 3 28 1.2
Five 2 0.1 1 1 10 0.4
Total 1,750 100 945 805 2,264 100








Variable mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
Happiness 6.610 1.787 7.122 1.546
Female 0.538 0.499 0.508 0.500
Age 57.05 8.63 30.41 5.88
Good health 0.301 0.459 0.692 0.462
Married 0.827 0.378 0.480 0.500
Widowed 0.077 0.266 - -
Years of schooling 11.09 2.36 12.26 2.49
Unemployed 0.086 0.281 0.066 0.248
Retired 0.321 0.467 - -
House ownership 0.543 0.498 0.246 0.431
Log household income 8.261 0.503 8.144 0.547
Log household size 0.809 0.387 0.767 0.539
Transfer to child 0.171 0.376 - -
Distance 46.33 109.83 - -
Same district 0.667 0.471 - -
Number of children 1.969 1.182 - -
Children yes - - 0.459 0.498
Year=2000 0.321 0.467 0.323 0.468
Year=2001 0.332 0.471 0.328 0.470
Year=2002 0.347 0.476 0.349 0.477
Observations 5041a 3771b
Source: SOEP 2000-2002
a Excludes multiple person-year observations for parents with several children.




Happiness responses of parents and children (in percent, n = 6507)
Happiness of child
Happiness
of parent 0-5 6-7 8-10 total
0-5 41.86 27.32 19.18 25.60
6-7 34.69 41.41 37.53 38.64
8-10 23.45 31.27 43.29 35.76
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 4
Year-to-year changes in happiness responses of parents and children (in percent, n =
4401)
Change in happiness of child
Change in happiness
of parent decrease no change increase total
decrease 7.18 7.75 5.77 20.70
no change 21.68 18.04 19.50 59.21
increase 6.59 6.79 6.70 20.09




Changes in happiness responses of parents conditional on changes for children (in per-
cent)
Change in happiness of child
Change in happiness
of parent ≤ −1 ≥ +1 ≤ −3 ≥ +3
decrease 20.26 18.05 16.27 15.50
no change 61.15 60.98 68.47 64.21
increase 18.59 20.97 15.25 20.30
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00




Dependent variable: Parent’s happiness, N = 5041
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Fixed Effects
OLS OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects+IV + Transfers
Happiness of child (η) 0.2491† 0.1682† 0.0562† 0.0185 0.0562†







Age 0.0731 0.0715 0.0670 0.0713
(0.0478) (0.1426) (0.1743) (0.1748)
Age squared -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Good health 1.0613† 0.3779† 0.3769† 0.3780†
(0.0583) (0.0600) (0.0579) (0.0581)
Married 0.2248 0.1857 0.1887 0.1854
(0.1372) (0.2673) (0.2583) (0.2569)
Widowed 0.0560 0.0346 0.0428 0.0342
(0.1661) (0.4107) (0.5495) (0.5459)
Years of schooling -0.0132 0.6224 0.5634† 0.6224†
(0.0173) (0.8807) (0.1565) (0.0613)
Unemployed -0.5920† -0.3036† -0.3023 -0.3032
(0.1208) (0.1163) (0.1634) (0.1630)
Retired -0.0822 -0.0199 -0.0225 -0.0199
(0.0925) (0.1076) (0.1229) (0.1225)
House ownership 0.3038† -0.2008 -0.2031 -0.2003
(0.0783) (0.1771) (0.1934) (0.1951)
Log household income 0.6890† 0.3122† 0.3204† 0.3121†
(0.0902) (0.1106) (0.1397) (0.1375)
Log household size -0.4385† 0.0694 0.0511 0.0696
(0.1565) (0.2021) (0.2179) (0.2051)
Distance (in 100 km) -0.1021† -0.0750 -0.0778 -0.0747
(0.0395) (0.0754) (0.0764) (0.0750)
Same district -0.0315 -0.1120 -0.1183 -0.1117
(0.0994) (0.1636) (0.1841) (0.1786)
Number of children -0.0236 0.0620 0.0620 0.0623
(0.0488) (0.0876) (0.0909) (0.0900)
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0418 0.2160 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes:
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level




Ordered Probit Models of Parent’s happiness, N = 5041
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Happiness of child (η) 0.2416† 0.1835† 0.0603†
(0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0251)






Age squared -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0010)












House ownership 0.2098† -0.1691
(0.0506) (0.1243)
Log household income 0.4286† 0.1615†
(0.0583) (0.0824)
Log household size -0.2811† 0.0906
(0.1011) (0.1339)
Distance (in 100 km) -0.0668† -0.0636
(0.0244) (0.0516)
Same district -0.0356 -0.1153
(0.0639) (0.1184)
Number of children -0.0114 0.0310
(0.0314) (0.0560)
Year effects No Yes Yes
Individual means No No Yes
Log-Likelihood -9534.2 -9014.5 -8944.7
Notes: see Table 6
Each model includes in addition 10 cut values
25